Short sellers and active long investors often disagree. We show that on average more than half of the heavily shorted stocks have high long positions by hedge funds from 2000 through 2011 (and over the extended sample period of 1990 to 2011). Heavily shorted stocks with high hedge fund holdings do not underperform and the heavily shorted stocks experience signicant negative abnormal returns only if they have low hedge fund holdings. The results suggest that disagreements of active investors and the actions they take help to incorporate both positive and negative information in stock prices. We further show that the results on the relation between disagreements of active investors and stock returns dier from the results based on other measures of dierent opinions such as analyst forecasts.
Introduction
It is well recognized that investors can have very dierent opinions about the value of a rm. Perhaps the clearest case of such disagreement is between short sellers and active long investors in the same rm. One recent example is the so-called`short war' between well-known investors, William Ackman, who took a large short position in Herbalife Ltd. (a nutrition marketing company) and Daniel Loeb and Carl Icahn, who both took large long positions.
1 The two sides not only took large opposite positions in the rm, but also battled publicly on the prospects and even the legality of Herbalife's business model.
In this paper we study the disagreements between active investors, specically the disagreements between short sellers and active long investors, and the relation between such disagreements and stock returns. We use the short interest on a stock to measure the expressed opinions of the short sellers and use the aggregate long positions of hedge funds in a stock to measure the expressed opinions of the active long investors. We assess the prevalence of the disagreements between active investors and further examine how such disagreements are associated with subsequent stock returns.
We classify high and low short positions based on both the absolute level of short interest in a stock (with cuto points of 1%, 5%, and 10% to form portfolios) as well as the relative ranking of short interest across stocks (with cuto points of 60%, 75%, and 90%). Similarly, we classify the high and low long positions of hedge funds based on the ratio of the aggregate number of shares hold by hedge funds relative to the total number of shares outstanding.
Using data on short interest and hedge fund holdings from 2000 to 2011, we document several striking ndings.
First, short sellers and active long investors often disagree. We nd that stocks that are example, in every quarter, on average, 361 rms have a short interest larger than 10%. For 115 of these rms, hedge funds hold more than 10% of the outstanding shares of each rm, and for 214 of these rms, hedge fund holding is greater than 5%. This nding is surprising given the well documented evidence that the distribution of short interests and hedge fund holdings are both highly skewed across stocks a small percentage of stocks have high short interest levels (high hedge fund holdings) and the majority of stocks have low short interest levels (low hedge fund holdings).
2 With the high skewness of the short interest and hedge fund holdings, the signicant overlapping of the short and active long positions in the same stock suggests that the two sides likely actively acquired information, possess very dierent opinions and made diering investment decisions based on their opinions.
Second, stocks that have both high short interest and high hedge fund holdings do not show any abnormal returns over the subsequent one to four quarters. This nding is in sharp contrast with the results based on short interest alone (see, e.g., Asquith and Meulbroek 1995) or based on hedge fund holdings alone (see, e.g., Grin and Xu 2009)-stocks with high short interest tend to have negative abnormal returns, whereas stocks with high hedge fund holdings tend to have positive abnormal returns. The result suggests that when the long and short investors disagree and trade in the opposite directions, stock prices reect the information from both sides adequately.
Third, stocks that have high short interest but low hedge fund holdings exhibit signicant negative abnormal returns. In particular, a portfolio with high short interest and low hedge fund holding has a signicant abnormal monthly return of -1.4% over the subsequent three months on a equal-weighting basis. For the value-weighted portfolio, the abnormal monthly return is -1.2%. This result suggests that much of the predictive power of short interest for lower subsequent stock returns comes from the high short interest stocks with low hedge fund holdings.
Fourth, stocks that have low short interest tend to have positive abnormal returns, and 2 See, for example, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) and Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan (2010) on short interest and Grin and Xu (2009) on hedge fund holdings.
hedge fund holdings generally have little impact on stock returns among these stocks. While there is some evidence that, particularly in the value weighted portfolios, low short interest stocks with high hedge fund holdings exhibit higher subsequent returns than those with low hedge fund holdings, the dierences are much weaker than for high short interest stocks and are often insignicant. Extant studies show that high hedge fund holdings weakly predict positive abnormal stock returns (see, e.g., Grin and Xu 2009 ) . Our results show that this relation is mostly driven by the stocks that have high hedge fund holdings and low short interest. Equally important, we nd a clear relation between low hedge fund holdings and stock returns, conditional on the level of short interest. Stocks with low hedge fund holdings but high short interest have negative subsequent returns, but stocks with low hedge fund holdings and low short interest have positive or insignicant abnormal returns. Our ndings show that the level of short interest and hedge funds holdings are related to subsequent stock returns. We also examine whether the change in short interest and the change in hedge fund holdings contain similar information. For the portfolio with an increase of short interest more than 1%, the future abnormal returns conditional on a decrease in hedge fund holding are about -6% per annum and statistically signicant, while they are not dierent from zeros if the hedge fund holding also increases by more than 1%. The return spread between the portfolios with an increase and a decrease in hedge fund holding is about -4.8% per annum, but not signicant. About 30% of stocks with an increase in short interest of 1% and above are also the ones with an increase of 1% and above in hedge fund holdings.
Portfolios with low short interest increase tend to have high future abnormal returns, and the portfolios with high hedge fund holding increase tend to have high future abnormal returns.
Our ndings are robust to issues such as portfolio weighting, the risk-adjustment procedure, extended time period of 1990-2011 that covers period with relatively lower short interest and lower hedge fund holdigns, and inclusion/exclusion of the nancial crises of 2008 -2009 (see, e.g., Ben-David et al. 2012 that document a signicant decline in the aggregate short interest in the period of [2008] [2009] , and that the U.S. market capitalization held by hedge funds declined signicantly during the same period.)
The results we document on the relation between short interest and hedge fund holdings as well as the subsequent return patterns dier from those based on short interest and aggregate institutional ownership (see, e.g., Asquith et al. 2005) . Since the overall institutional ownership represents both passive and active holdings, extant studies on the relation between institutional ownership and short selling typically use institutional ownership as a proxy for short-sale constraints, rather than active long positions. We show that our results based on hedge fund holdings are not driven by institutional ownership. In fact, we nd that high short interest stocks exhibit lower returns regardless of institutional ownership levels.
The results we document also dier from those based on diverse opinions as proxied by nancial analysts earnings forecasts. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) nd that stocks on which market participants have diverse opinions, as proxied by nancial analysts earnings forecasts, tend to have negative returns. Due to short sale constraints, investors who have negative information may not be able to trade on the stocks, i.e., establish short positions in those stocks. Because the prices of these stocks do not fully reect all negative information, these stocks have lower returns (see also , Miller 1977) . Our ndings dier from the results based on the dierent opinions of other market participants in several important aspects. In our analysis, we measure the disagreements of active investors based on the observed trading positions, we show that the stocks with high disagreements do not exhibit abnormal returns, whereas stocks with negative opinions by short sellers without presence of positive opinions have negative returns. We check our results for two subsamples of stocks with high and low dispersions of opinions based on nancial analyst forecast and nd that our results hold for both subsamples.
Our study contributes to the literature on both short selling and hedge fund investment decisions. Various studies have examined the information content of short interest. Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) nd that high short interest predicts negative abnormal returns for NYSE/AMEX stocks, and Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002) nd a sim-ilar relation for NASDAQ stocks. Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan (2010) nd that relatively heavily traded stocks with low short interest experience both statistically and economically signicant positive abnormal returns.
A large literature has examined the information content of institutional holdings, as well as the investment decisions of mutual funds and hedge funds. Gompers and Metrick (2001) nd a positive relation between institutional ownership and future stock returns. Jiang and Sun (2014) nd a positive relation between the dispersion of mutual fund holdings and stock returns. Grin and Xu (2009) , however, only nd a weak relation between hedge fund holdings and future stock returns. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) study the hedge fund holdings during the technology bubble between 1998 and 2000. They nd that the hedge funds heavily invested in technology stocks and skillfully anticipated their price peaks. A portfolio that mimics the hedge fund holdings has positive abnormal future returns. Aragon, Hertzel, and Shi (2013) and Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013) study the hedge fund holdings through condential 13F lings. They nd that stock in these holdings are associated with information-sensitive events and greater information asymmetry. These holdings generates positive abnormal future returns. Our ndings show that it is important to evaluate the long and short positions jointly in order to assess the information content of short interests and the long positions of active investors.
Our study also contributes to the recent literature on information acquisition decisions in nancial markets. Several recent theoretical papers argue that the information acquisition decision is a critical component of the overall investment decision process and that studying the information acquisition decision can oer new insights on understanding investment decision making (see, e.g., Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2009, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2010) . In a model with endogenous information acquisition, Nezafat, Schroder, and Wang (2015) show that if the costs of short selling vary across stocks, those with low costs encourage greater information acquisition and can lead to higher short selling activities. Our results are consistent with the arguments of these models. For example, high short interest by itself may not predict abnormal future stock returns even if short selling activities are driven by information acquisition and negative information acquired by the short sellers. This is because high short interest not only reects the`negative' information acquired by some investors, but also indicates intensive information acquisition that could lead to`informationdriven' long positions by other investors. As such, stocks with both active long and short positions do not exhibit abnormal returns as both positive and negative information acquired by the investors is reected in the stock price.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the short interest and hedge fund holdings data we use in the study. The baseline results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 investigates the robustness of the results and potential explanations. Section 5 oers concluding remarks.
Data and Summary Statistics
The short interest on a stock represents the positions established by short sellers in the stock. Though not exclusively, short selling typically is conducted by active professional investors such as hedge fund managers. Short interest on a stock thus reects the opinions of a group of active investors as well as the actions taken by these investors based on their opinions. We obtain monthly short interest data from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ for the period of January 1988 to December 2011. The level of short interest in individual stocks is reported to the exchanges by member rms. Exchanges report short interest twice per month since September 2007.
To be consistent with the short interest data from the earlier period we keep the data at the monthly frequency. Nasdaq short interest data start from July of 1988.
To identify active investors who hold long positions in stocks, we focus on the sample of investors who have similar objectives as those of short sellers. Hedge fund managers are active investors who are not highly constrained and could hold long or short positions depending on their information. Thus the long positions of hedge fund managers and short positions of short sellers (mostly hedge funds) are from a homogeneous group of investors.
We use hedge funds as the sample of active investors for two additional reasons. First, many institutional investors are passive investors, so overall institutional ownership represents both active and passive holdings. Second, even for active mutual fund and pension fund managers, they often face short-sale constraints and many other types of institutional constraints, and such constraints can directly aect their information acquisition decisions (see, e.g., Nezafat et al., 2015) and their use of information (Cao, Han and Wang, 2014) .
To construct the sample of hedge funds, we start from the list of institutional investors in Thomson Financial's CDA/Spectrum 13F database. CDA/Spectrum divides institutions into ve types: 1) bank trust departments; 2) insurance companies; 3) investment companies and their managers; 4) independent investment advisers; and 5) others. We exclude institutions classied as type 1 (bank trust departments) or type 2 (insurance companies). For each of the remaining institutions, we manually check its SEC ADV forms (like Brunnermeier and Nagel 2004 and Grin and Xu 2009) and require an institution to have over 50 percent of investment listed as`other pooled investment vehicles' (private investment companies, private equity, and hedge funds) or over 50 percent of clients as`high net worth individuals' to be included in our hedge fund sample. Further, we require the institutions to charge performance-based fees to be included in the hedge fund sample. Finally, we manually check the website of each institution that satises the above requirements to conrm whether it is a hedge-fund-only business or not.
One may be concerned that some hedge fund holding companies do not register as investment advisors and hence do not le ADV forms. This issue is of little signicance because as detailed in Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008) , a 2004 SEC investment advisor rule amendment requires all U.S. based hedge funds with more than 14 clients, assets more than $25 million, and lockup period of less than two years, to le ADV forms. It also requires all internationally based hedge funds with more than 14 U.S. based investors to le We keep the stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ that have a CRSP share code of 10 or 11. The sample period is from 2000 to 2011. We start from the rst quarter of 2000, so in total there are 141 months. We replace missing value of short interest and hedge fund holding with zeros, and our results are robust if we drop the missing values.
In our analysis, we form portfolios based on the one-way sort of the level of short interest, on the one-way sort of the level of hedge fund holdings, and the two-way sort of short interest and hedge fund holdings. For the one-way sort of the level of short interest, we use the absolute level of short interest in a stock and cuto points of 1%, 5%, and 10% to form 4 portfolios. For instance, a rm with a short interest above 10% belongs to the high-shortinterest portfolio and a rm with a short interest below 1% belongs to the low-short-interest portfolio. We also use the relative ranking of short interest across stocks and cuto points of 60%, 75%, and 90% to form portfolios. Similar approaches are used to form portfolios based on hedge fund holdings using the ratio of the aggregate number of shares hold by hedge funds to the total number of shares outstanding to assign a rm to a portfolio. For the two-way sort of short interest and hedge fund holdings, we form 16 portfolios based on both the absolute level and the relative ranking of short interest and hedge fund holdings to assign a rm to a portfolio. Carhart (1997) . The results in Table2 show that the distribution of stocks across the dierent shortinterest and hedge fund holding portfolios as well as the results on stock returns of these portfolios are consistent with results reported in recent studies (see, e.g., Boehmer et al. 2010 and Grin and Xu 2009). We nd similar results when we use Carhart four-factor model for computing abnormal returns and for space considerations we do not report the results.
Disagreement and Subsequent Stock Returns
We next present our main ndings based on the two-way sort of short interest and hedge fund holdings. Table 3 shows the two-way double sorting results based on the DGTW benchmarks.
At the end of each quarter, rms are sorted into 16 portfolios based on the level of short interest and the level of hedge fund holdings. The equal and value weighted abnormal returns of each portfolio in the next three months are computed. In the rst panel, we sort rms by the absolute value of their short interest and hedge fund holdings. The cuto points are 1%, 5%, and 10% for both short interest and hedge fund holdings.
In 3, the row titled 'Firms' reports the average number of rms in each portfolio. An unexpected nding is that for the most shorted portfolio (i.e., the portfolio that includes rms with short interest ≥ 10%), the number of rms conditional on the most hedge-fundhold portfolio (i.e., the portfolio that includes rms for which at least 10% of shares are hold by hedge funds) contains about four times more rms than the one conditional on the least hedge-fund-hold portfolio (115 vs. 34). This means that almost 80% of the most shorted stocks are also the ones most longed by hedge funds even though the majority of stocks have low hedge fund ownership. If we group the two highest short-interest stock portfolios ((≥ 5%) as high short-interest stocks, the results are even more striking (214 vs. 34). Even if we use 5% as the single cuto point for classifying high and low short-interest and hedge fund holdings, more than half of the high short interest stocks have high hedge fund holdings (214 vs. 147).
The nding is even more surprising given the well documented evidence, which is further conrmed in our sample that the distribution of short interest and hedge fund holdings are both highly skewed across stocks-a small percentage of stocks have high short interest levels (high hedge fund holdings) and the majority of stocks have low short interest levels (low hedge fund holdings). With the high skewness of the short interest and hedge fund holdings, can not be ignored when study the future returns of shorted stocks.
The results from value weighted portfolios are similar to the ones from equal weighted portfolios, but the economic magnitude and statistical signicance level are slightly smaller.
For the highest short interest portfolios, the future abnormal returns conditional on the highest hedge fund holdings are insignicant, while they are negative and signicant conditional on the lowest hedge fund holdings. The spread between these two portfolios are -13.2%. The reduce economic magnitude suggests that the disagreement between long and short investors is likely to be on the stocks with small capitalization.
The rest results in the rst panel are consistent with those in Table 2 . Portfolios with low short interest tend to have high future abnormal returns, and the portfolios with high hedge fund holdings tend to have high future abnormal returns. The one-way sorting results hold in the two-way sorting.
In the second panel, rms are sorted by the percentiles in each quarter. For short interest, the cuto points are 80%, 90%, and 95%. For hedge fund holdings, the cuto points are 60%, 75%, and 90%. The results are largely similar to those in the rst panel. For the highest short interest portfolios, the future abnormal returns conditional on the highest hedge fund holdings are insignicant, while they are negative and signicant conditional on the lowest hedge fund holdings. Within the highest short interest portfolios, the return spread between the highest and lowest hedge fund holdings portfolios is 13.2% per annum for equal weighted portfolio, and it is about 60% higher than the average abnormal returns of the highest short interest portfolio. These results hold consistently for both equal and value weighted portfolios, while the economic magnitude of results from equal weighted portfolios are stronger than those from value weighted portfolios.
The number of rms in the second panel is more evenly distributed within the highest short interest portfolios than the one in the rst panel, so the dierence between the highest and lowest hedge fund holdings portfolio is not as striking as before. However, there are still 20% of the most shorted stocks that are also the ones most longed by hedge funds. The hedge fund holdings materially changes the future abnormal returns of these most sorted stocks.
In the third and fourth panel, we repeat the exercise but use alternative percentile sorting methods. In the third panel, the cuto points are 80%, 90%, and 95% for both short interest and hedge fund holdings. In the third panel the cuto points are 60%, 75%, and 90% for both short interest and hedge fund holdings. The results are largely similar to those in the rst and second panel. The results from value weighted portfolios are stronger than before, and become close to those from equal weighted portfolios. The economic magnitude and the statistical signicance level vary across dierent sorting specications, but the qualitative results are robust.
In Table 3 , we use dierent sorting methods and nd that the future abnormal returns are sharply dierent for most shorted stocks conditional on dierent hedge fund holdings.
Nonetheless, the results can be driven by the benchmarks. To address this concern, Table   4 presents the results based on the Carhart regression models. At the end of each quarter, rms are independently sorted into 4 by 4 portfolios by their short interest and by their hedge fund holdings. The equal and value weighted raw returns of each portfolio in the next three months are computed. We use one-month Treasury bill rate to calculate excess returns for each portfolio, and use Fama-French three-factor and a momentum factor to calculate the alpha. Standard errors are adjusted by Newey-West method.
In the rst panel, we sort rms by the absolute value of their short interest and hedge fund holdings. The cuto points are 1%, 5%, and 10%. The left part shows the equal weighted results. Conditional on the lowest hedge fund holdings, the future abnormal returns are -20.4% per annum for the most shorted stocks, and are highly signicant. In contrast, conditional on the highest hedge fund holdings, the future abnormal returns are 0% for the most shorted stocks, and are not signicant. The value weighted results are similar. For the most shorted stocks, the future abnormal returns conditional on the lowest hedge fund holdings are -16.8% per annum and highly signicant, while they are not dierent from zeros conditional on the lowest hedge fund holdings. In addition, portfolios with low short interest tend to have high future abnormal returns, and the portfolios with high hedge fund holdings tend to have high future abnormal returns. All these results are consistent with those in Tables 3 and 2 , and therefore they are robust to alternative benchmarks.
For comparison, from the second to the fourth panel, we repeat the exercise and use dierent percentile sorting methods. The cuto points are the same as those from the corresponding panels in Table 3 . Again, the results are similar to those in the rst panel.
The economic magnitude are slightly changed but the signicance level are intact. For the most shorted stocks, the future abnormal returns conditional on the lowest hedge fund holdings are about -14% per annum and highly signicant, while they are not dierent from zeros conditional on the lowest hedge fund holdings. In general, only the portfolio conditional on the highest hedge fund holdings has insignicant future abnormal returns. For moderate hedge fund holdings, such as the second and third hedge fund holdings portfolios, the abnormal returns are negative and signicant for most shorted stocks.
Both the DGTW and regression benchmarks give similar results, which are also robust to dierent sorting methods. Next we perform additional tests to check the robustness and to see whether the results are unique to our mechanism. Table ? ? shows the two-way double sorting results of abnormal returns based on the DGTW benchmarks. At the end of each quarter, rms are independently sorted into 4 by 4 portfolios by their short interest and by their hedge fund holdings. We report the number of rms in each portfolios and compute the equal and value weighted abnormal returns of each portfolio in the next 6 months. Because we sort portfolios every 3 months and hold a portfolio for the next 6 months, a problem of overlapping portfolios arises. We take the average to solve this problem. For example, at the end of March, or the end of the quarter, rms are sorted into 16 portfolios, and we hold these portfolio from April to September. At the end of the June, or the end of the second quarter, rms are again sorted into 16 portfolios, and we hold these portfolio from July to December. For any portfolio i, there are two such portfolios from July to September: one is formed based on the information at the end of March, and one is formed based on the information at the end of June. We rst calculate the equal and value weighted abnormal return as well as the number of rms for each of the overlapping portfolios, and then take the average as the abnormal return (equal or value weighted) and the number of rms for portfolio i in each month from July to September. We repeat the exercise and calculate the monthly abnormal return for each portfolio from 2000 to 2011.
Longer Holding Period
In the rst panel, we sort rms by the absolute value of their short interest and hedge fund holdings. The cuto points are 1%, 5%, and 10% for both short interest and hedge fund holdings. The results in the rst panel are largely similar to those in the rst panel of Table 3 . The sign, the signicance, and even the economic magnitude are barely changed.
In the second panel, rms are sorted by the percentiles in each quarter. For short interest, the cuto points are 80%, 90%, and 95%. For hedge fund holdings, the cuto points are 60%, 75%, and 90%. These results are similar to those in the third panel of Table 3 , but the economic magnitude as well as the signicance level is smaller. It is expected as the portfolio is formed based on both the recent and the dated information. Table 5 presents the results based on the Carhart regression models. At the end of each quarter, rms are independently sorted into 4 by 4 portfolios by their short interest and by their hedge fund holdings. The equal and value weighted raw returns of each portfolio in the next 6 months are computed. The portfolio sorting is the same as the one in Table ? ?. Table ? ? shows the two-way double sorting results of abnormal returns based on the DGTW benchmarks. At the end of each quarter, rms are independently sorted into 4 by 4 portfolios by their short interest and by their hedge fund holdings. We report the number of rms in each portfolios and compute the equal and value weighted abnormal returns of each portfolio in the next 12 months. Because we sort portfolios every 3 months and hold a portfolio for the next 12 months, there could be 4 overlapping portfolios in a month. We take the average of these 4 portfolios. For example, for a portfolio i in July, one is formed at the end of June, one is formed at the end of March, one is formed at the end of December in last year, and one is formed at the end of September in last year. We rst calculate the equal and value weighted abnormal return as well as the number of rms for each of the overlapping portfolios, and then take the average as the abnormal return (equal or value weighted) and the number of rms for portfolio i in the month of July. We repeat the exercise and calculate the monthly abnormal return for each portfolio from 2000 to 2011. Table 6 presents the results based on the Carhart regression models. At the end of each quarter, rms are independently sorted into 4 by 4 portfolios by their short interest and by their hedge fund holdings. The equal and value weighted raw returns of each portfolio in the next 12 months are computed. The portfolio sorting is the same as the one in Table ? ?.
Changes in Disagreement and Subsequent Stock Returns
We argue that the combination of hedge fund holdings and short interest contains important information of the stocks, and we nd that the most shorted stocks can also be the ones that are most longed by hedge fund. In the previous section, we use the levels of short interest and the level of hedge fund holdings to measure the opinions of long and short investors. If the level of holding contains important information, we conjecture that the change of the hedge fund holdings short interest should also contain similar information. We test this idea, and present the results in Tables 7 and 8 .
The change of hedge fund holdings in quarter t is the dierence between the hedge fund holdings in quarter t and t-1. The short interest data are monthly updated. To be consistent, the change of short interest in quarter t is the dierence between the short interest at the end of quarter t and t-1. Table 7 presents the results based on the DGTW benchmark. In the rst panel, we sort rms by the absolute value of the change of their short interest and hedge fund holdings. The cuto points are 0, 0.5%, and 1%. Given the cuto based on the absolute value in Table 3 , these changes represent roughly 10 percentage increase per quarter.
Consistent with our conjecture, the results are indeed similar to those in Table 3 . For the portfolio with an increase of short interest more than 1%, the future abnormal returns conditional on a decrease in hedge fund holdings are about -6% per annum and statistically signicant, while they are not dierent from zeros if the hedge fund holdings also increases by more than 1%. This result hold for both equal and value weighted portfolios. The return spread between the portfolios with an increase and a decrease in hedge fund holdings is about -4.8% per annum, but not signicant. About 30% of stocks with an increase in short interest of 1% and above are also the ones with an increase of 1% and above in hedge fund holdings.
Portfolios with low short interest increase tend to have high future abnormal returns, and the portfolios with high hedge fund holdings increase tend to have high future abnormal returns.
In the second panel, rms are sorted by the percentiles of the change in each quarter. For short interest, the cuto points are 80%, 90%, and 95%. For hedge fund holdings, the cuto points are 60%, 75%, and 90%. All results are similar to the ones in the rst panel, with some variations in the economic magnitude, statistical signicance level and the number of rms in each portfolio. These variations do not change our basic ndings.
Tables 8 reports the results based on the Carhart four-factor model. The rst and second panels use the same sorting as the corresponding ones in Table 7 , but the results are somewhat stronger. For the portfolio with an increase of short interest more than 1%, the future abnormal returns conditional on a decrease in hedge fund holdings are about -8% per annum and highly signicant, while they are not dierent from zeros if the hedge fund holdings also increases by more than 1%. This result holds for both equal and value weighted portfolios. The return spread between the portfolios with an increase and a decrease in hedge fund holdings is about -5% per annum.
Although the qualitative results in Tables 7 and 8 are similar to the ones before, the economic magnitude and statistical signicance level are smaller. There are several possible reasons. First, the hedge fund holdings and short interest can be persistent. For two stocks with persistently high short interest, the subsequent return for the stock with persistently high hedge fund holdings will be dierent from the one with persistently low hedge fund holdings. These two stocks will be in dierent portfolios in Table 3 . If we sort rms by the change, these two stocks can be in the same portfolio. Therefore, the results are not as sharp as the ones from the sorting based on the level. Second, this change is based on the absolute value. It is likely that the percentage change for a individual stock may not be high, so it contains less information. Despite the potential disadvantages of this sorting, similar results are still obtained, reinforcing the robustness of our ndings.
4 Robustness Checks
Aggregate Institutional Ownership
We argue that hedge fund holdings represents long positions of active investors thus could contain important information that could aect the future abnormal returns for the most shorted stocks. In this subsection we test whether the general institutional holdings could replace the information role of the hedge fund holdings. Because overall institutional ownership represents both passive and active holdings, extant studies on the relation between institutional ownership and short selling typically use institutional ownership as a proxy for short-sale constraints, rather than active long positions (see, e.g., Asquith et al., 2005 and Nagel, 2005) . Nevertheless, these studies did nd some evidence on the relation between the intersection of institutional holdings and short interest and stock returns. We now examine whether or not our results based on hedge fund holdings diers from those based on institutional ownership.
We obtain institutional equity holding and trading from CDA Spectrum 13F Table 11 presents the results when we use the institutional ownership to replace hedge fund holdings. Because the institutional ownership is much higher than the hedge fund holdings, the sorting based on the same absolute value is not directly comparable. Therefore, we focus on the relative sorting with the cuto points of 80%, 90%, and 95% for short interest, and 60%, 75%, and 90% for institutional ownership. In the rst panel, the results based on the DGTW benchmark are reported. In the second panel, the results based the Carhart regression model are reported. They are analogous to those in the second panel in Tables 3   and 4 .
In both panels, the future abnormal returns for most shorted stocks are negative and highly signicant irrespective of the level of the institutional ownership. For the DGTW benchmark, the future abnormal returns for the highest short interest is about -7.2% per annum conditional on the highest institutional ownership. In regressions, this number is about -9.6% per annum. In addition, the return spreads for the most shorted stocks between the highest and lowest institutional ownership portfolios is smaller than those between hedge fund holdings portfolios. The results imply that the long side information in the hedge fund holdings is not the same as that in the general institutional holdings.
Dispersion of Financial Analyst Opinions
Our results based on the disagreements of active investors dier from the results based on the dierent opinions of other market participants in several important aspects. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) Miller, 1977) . In our analysis, we measure the disagreements of active investors based on the observed trading positions, we show that the stocks with high disagreements do not exhibit abnormal returns while stocks with negative opinions by short sellers without presence of positive opinions have negative returns.
In this subsection, we study the relation between our results and those based on the dierent opinions of nancial analysts. The major proxy we use is the analyst forecast dispersion scaled by the mean monthly price. The results are similar if we use the analyst forecast dispersion scaled by absolute mean forecast. We examine our results for two sub-samples of stocks with high and low dispersions of opinions based on nancial analyst forecast.
In each quarter, rms are independently sorted by the percentiles. For dispersion, the cuto point is 50%. For short interest, the cuto points are 80%, 90%, and 95%. For hedge fund holdings, the cuto points are 60%, 75%, and 90%. We have 2 by 4 by 4, and in total 32 portfolios in each month. The equal and value weighted abnormal returns of each portfolio in the next three months are computed. The results based on the DGTW benchmark and Carhart regression model are reported in Tables ?? and 12 respectively. For both low and high dispersion portfolios, portfolios with low short interest tend to have high future abnormal returns, and the portfolios with high hedge fund holdings tend to have high future abnormal returns. This result is similar to the one in previous tables.
Because the analyst forecast dispersion are related to the dierent options among investors, we expect that our results are stronger in the high dispersion portfolios. Indeed, in the second panel in Table 12 the results are similar to the ones in previous tables. For the high dispersion portfolios, the future abnormal returns for the most shorted stock are negative and signicant conditional on the lowest hedge fund holdings, and they are not dierent from zeros conditional on the highest hedge fund holdings. This result holds for both equal and value weighted portfolios.
For the low dispersion portfolios in the rst panel in Table 12 , the qualitative results are similar to the second panel, but the economic magnitude and statistical signicance level become smaller. Actually, the abnormal returns in Table ? ? are generally not signicant.
One issue is the data limitation. The requirement for the dispersion measure reduce 50% of the sample, while in the three-way sorting the number of portfolio in each month is doubled from 16 to 32. These changes result in small number of rm in each portfolio. The portfolio returns are volatile, and the statistical signicance is dicult to achieve. Nonetheless, it still provides important information how the measure of dierent opinion is related to our results.
Extended-Period Analysis
In the main analysis we focus on the sample period from 2000 to 2011. One major reason is that the hedge fund holdings information is sparse and the level of holding is small before 2000. However, it is still interesting to see whether our results hold for a longer period. In this subsection we provide the evidence for the period from 1990 to 2011 in Tables ?? and 10. Table ? ? reports the results analogous to those in Table 3 . All results remain. For example, the left part in the rst panel shows the equal weighted results. Conditional on the lowest hedge fund holdings, the future abnormal returns are -15.6% per annum for the most shorted stocks, and are highly signicant. In contrast, conditional on the highest hedge fund holdings, the future abnormal returns are 7.2% for the most shorted stocks, but not signicant. For the most shorted stocks, the return spread between the highest and lowest hedge fund holding portfolios is 22.8% per annum. Similar results are obtained in value weighted portfolios. The economic magnitude and statistical signicance level are almost the same as those in Table 3 . Table 10 reports the results analogous to those in Table 4 . All results remain. One exception is in the second panel with the percentile sorting. For the most shorted stocks, the future abnormal returns are negative and signicant for both the highest and lowest hedge fund holding portfolios. One possible reason is that the hedge fund holdings before 2000 is low. Even at the 90 percentile and above, the level of the hedge fund holdings may not be large enough to materially change the subsequent returns of the most shorted stocks.
It could explain why the results based on the absolute value sorting in the rst panel are robust. Nonetheless, the return spread for the most shorted stocks between the highest and lowest hedge fund holding portfolios is still large. It is 9.6% per annum for equal weighted portfolio, and 3.6% per annum for value weighted portfolio.
Conclusions
We nd that short sellers and active long investors often disagree. Over our sample period, on average, more than half of the stocks with high short interest have high long positions by hedge funds. Furthermore, the diering opinions of the active investors matter for future stocks returns. Stocks that have both high short interest and high hedge fund holdings do not show any abnormal returns. Stocks that have high short interest but low hedge fund holdings, however, exhibit signicant negative abnormal returns.
Our ndings show that it is important to evaluate the long and short positions jointly in order to assess the information content of short interest and of the long holdings of active investors. Boehmer, E., and J. Wu (2013) Item names refer the names in the data sets respectively. At the end of each quarter, rms are sorted independently into 4 by 4 portfolios by short interest (SI) and hedge fund holding (HFH). We report the mean and the median of the rm characteristics for the overall sample, the most shorted portfolio, the most longed portfolio, and the most both short and longed portfolio. Variables from CCM are winsorized at a 1% level each tail in each year. In the rst panel, rms are sorted based on the absolute value. The cuto points are 1%, 5%, and 10% for SI and HFH. In the second panel, rms are sorted based on the relative value. The cuto points are 80%, 90%, and 95% for SI, and 60%, 75%, and 90% for HFH. t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 This table presents the double sorting results. At the end of each quarter, rms are sorted independently into 4 by 4 portfolios by short interest (SI) and hedge fund holding (HFH). Equal weighted (E.W.) and value weighted (V.W.) raw returns are calculated in the next 3 months. We use the Carhart regression model and report the alpha for the excess return of each portfolio. In the rst panel, rms are sorted based on the absolute value. The cuto points are 1%, 5%, and 10% for SI and HFH. From the second to the third panel, rms are sorted based on the relative value. In the second panel, the cuto points are 60%, 75%, and 90% for SI and HFH. In the third panel, the cuto points are 80%, 90%, and 95% for SI, and 60%, 75%, and 90% for HFH. In each panel, the rows from the top to bottom represent low to high SI, and the columns from left to right represent low to high HFH. The alpha and the t-statistics are reported for each portfolio. t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 We take the average for overlapping portfolios. For example, for a portfolio i in July, one is formed at the end of June, one is formed at the end of March, one is formed at the end of December in last year, and one is formed at the end of September in last year. We rst calculate the equal and value weighted return for each of the overlapping portfolios, and then take the average as the return (equal or value weighted) for portfolio i in the month of July. We use the Carhart regression model and report the alpha for the excess return of each portfolio. In the rst panel, rms are sorted based on the absolute value. The cuto points are 1%, 5%, and 10% for SI and HFH. In the second panel, rms are sorted based on the relative value. The cuto points are 80%, 90%, and 95% for SI, and 60%, 75%, and 90% for HFH. In each panel, the rows from the top to bottom represent low to high SI, and the columns from left to right represent low to high HFH. t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table 10 : Regression: 1990 Regression: -2011 This table presents the double sorting results. At the end of each quarter, rms are sorted independently into 4 by 4 portfolios by short interest (SI) and hedge fund holding (HFH). Equal weighted (E.W.) and value weighted (V.W.) raw returns are calculated in the next 3 months. We use the Carhart regression model and report the alpha for the excess return of each portfolio. In the rst panel, rms are sorted based on the absolute value. The cuto points are 1%, 5%, and 10% for SI and HFH. In the second panel, rms are sorted based on the relative value. The cuto points are 80%, 90%, and 95% for SI, and 60%, 75%, and 90% for HFH. In each panel, the rows from the top to bottom represent low to high SI, and the columns from left to right represent low to high HFH. t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 
